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We analyze conditions under which candidates’ reputations may
aﬀect the beliefs of the voters over what policy will be implemented by
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the winning candidate of an election. We develop a model of repeated
elections with complete information in which candidates are purely
ideological. We analyze an equilibrium in which voters’ strategies
involve a credible threat to punish candidates who renege of their
campaign promises, and all campaign promises are believed by voters,
and honored by candidates. We characterize the maximal credible
campaign promises and obtain that the degree to which promises are
credible in equilibrium is an increasing function of the value of a
candidate’s reputation.
JEL: D8
1. Introduction
Politicians seeking oﬃce make promises. This is presumably done in the
belief that the promises will alter voters’ beliefs about the policies the
politician will implement if he is elected, and about the capabilities of the
politician. The flip side of the coin is that these promises may later come
back to haunt an oﬃce holder seeking re-election, so candidates must tem-
per their promises in anticipation of future elections. This paper presents
a model in which these eﬀects arise as equilibrium phenomena.
We focus on one aspect of political campaigns, that we refer to as
credible commitment, and study it using an infinitely repeated version of the
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one-dimensional spatial model, where candidates have policy preferences
that change over time. With suﬃciently patient voters and candidates,
there are many equilibria. We characterize the range of credible promises
that candidates can commit to. Campaign promises provide a mechanism
for voters to select among multiple equilibria in a repeated game, much like
a focal point. In this sense, credible promises solve a coordination problem
that arises naturally in the context of multi-principal agency problems,
where the many principals must somehow converge on a common rule in
order to eﬀectively control the agent. Campaign promises aﬀect voters’
expectations about what policies will be chosen by an elected oﬃcial and
they provide a benchmark for voters to link policy decisions with future re-
election. In the absence of such public announcement, it is hard to imagine
how voters would be able to magically come to a common agreement about
what constitutes acceptable performance by an elected oﬃcial.
The diﬃculty with the argument that campaign statements are a mere
act of promising, or pledging, to carry out a particular policy is that they
are cheap talk. That is, fixing all actions of all participants, no payoﬀs dif-
fer when messages alone are changed. Consider, then, a problem in which
there is a single election in which candidates vie for oﬃce. Suppose candi-
dates are purely ideological, that is, that they receive no direct payoﬀ from
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holding oﬃce, but care only about the policy chosen. In this environment,
any candidate who is elected will choose the policy alternative that he most
prefers, regardless of any campaign promise that might have been made.
Consequently, if voters have rational expectations, no campaign promise
can alter voters’ beliefs about what action will be taken by a candidate
if he is elected. If there were any statement that did alter beliefs in a
way that increased the probability of election for a candidate, the candi-
date would make such a statement regardless of what he intended to do if
elected. Hence, no campaign statement can convey information that alters
the chance of election.1
When we move from the case of a single election to multiple elections,
campaign promises may be costly because voters can condition their strate-
gies on these promises in the repeated game. Voters may vote diﬀerently
in future elections if a candidate promises to do something if elected, but
subsequently reneges on that promise. Simply put, voters may punish a
candidate for reneging on campaign promises by voting him out of oﬃce.
In this way the promises serve a coordinating role for voters. Under cer-
tain conditions, threats of such punishment can support an equilibrium in
which campaign promises are kept, and in which voters’ beliefs about what
1See Harrington (1992) for an elaboration of this argument.
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a candidate will do if elected are aﬀected by campaign promises. There is
a potential problem, however, with voters behaving on the basis of “retro-
spective” assessments of candidates: at the time of the next election, the
future choices that the candidate might make could look far better than
those of his opponent. Threats to vote candidates out of oﬃce regardless
of the circumstances may not be credible, or in other words, strategies em-
ploying such threats are dominated. Despite the fact that these strategies
are dominated, they are often used to justify the assumption that politi-
cians can commit to platforms or policies prior to an election.
We present and analyze a dynamic model in which candidates make
campaign promises, and voters use those promises to form beliefs about the
policies the candidate will choose, if elected. We analyze equilibria of the
model in which some promises will be kept, even when the promised policy
diﬀers from the elected candidate’s ideal point, because of fear of voter
reprisal. However, unlike the retrospective punishments described above,
punishment in our model is prospective. Voters discipline candidates by
believing some promises a candidate makes as long as that candidate has
never reneged on a promise in the past. Once he reneges, no future promises
will be believed. Candidates only make promises they intend to keep, and
keep those promises if elected. In other words, we consider only subgame
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perfect equilibria.
Modelling campaign promises in this way has advantages beyond simply
avoiding dominated strategies. The incentive to fulfill campaign promises
is based on the threat that future promises will not be believed; the cost to
a candidate of this punishment is finite. Consequently, promises to carry
out policies that are known to be anathema to the candidate will not be be-
lieved, since it will be understood that the gain from reneging will outweigh
the cost in lost credibility.2 Thus, unlike models that simply assume that
candidates can commit, we find that there typically will be policies that
candidates can commit to (credibly), but other policies that they cannot
commit to. In addition, the precise modelling of the source of a candidate’s
ability to alter voters’ beliefs about what he will do if elected, permits an
analysis of how the magnitude of his credibility is aﬀected by circumstances
such as the probability of being elected, the expected duration of his po-
litical career, his opponent, etc.
1.1. Related literature
2Think, for example, of the skepticism that greeted Bob Dole’s promise to cut taxes
after a long history of arguing against the wisdom of this.
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As mentioned above, much of the work on campaigns has followed Downs
(1957) in assuming, implicitly or explicitly, that candidates could com-
mit to platforms or policies they would implement if elected. Ferejohn
(1986), (and Barro (1973)), consider a repeated principal agent model of
sequential elections in which the threat of being thrown out of oﬃce re-
duces the incentives for shirking while in oﬃce. Candidates are identical
and have no policy preferences, and they are judged by their past perfor-
mance, rather than any campaign promises or commitments they might
make. Austen-Smith and Banks (1989) explore a two period variation of
this principal agent model. Candidates propose performance goals during
the election, and achievement of these goals depends on a combination of
eﬀort and luck. They look at the subset of implicit contracts where voters
discipline the incumbent by a quadratic scoring rule that compares actual
performance to the incumbent’s performance goal. Wittman (1990) ana-
lyzes a model with politicians facing an infinite sequence of elections with
unchanging ideal points. He characterizes the equilibrium between the can-
didates when they are restricted to choosing the same policy each period.
This diﬀers from our model in two ways: voters play no active role in that
model, and candidates never compare the costs and benefits in carrying
out the policies, so issues of credibility do not enter the model. Banks and
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Duggan (2002) analyze a dynamic, multidimensional policy model with-
out campaigns, and characterize equilibria in terms of simple strategies.
In each period, the incumbent faces a random opponent; they show ex-
istence of an equilibrium in which an individual votes for the incumbent
if his utility meets a critical threshold, which is determined endogenously.
There is no consideration of prospective evaluations of candidates. Duggan
and Fey (2002) investigate properties of the set of equilibria with infinitely
repeated elections and complete information, with oﬃce-motivated candi-
dates and without campaign promises. In their model there is no issue of
candidate credibility or retrospective voting, since candidates are purely of-
fice motivated and therefore are indiﬀerent over which policy they actually
implement if elected.
This earlier work either ignored the eﬀect of a politician’s performance
in oﬃce on the chances of reelection, or considered only oﬃce-motivated
candidates. Most of the work that embodies retrospective assessment leaves
out any possibility of campaign credibility. Our contribution is to model po-
litical campaigns by ideological candidates who make campaign promises,
with voters who are fully rational in the degree to which the promises can
be believed.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we focus on
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the case in which there are (potentially) infinite elections and complete in-
formation. In this case we show how candidates may (rationally) choose to
maintain a reputation for fulfilling campaign promises. We do this initially
for the case in which candidates have linear utility functions. We next an-
alyze several extensions, including the eﬀect that concavity in utility has
on the set of believable promises. We end with a brief discussion of our
results.
2. Sequential elections
With an infinite horizon, promises can be credible in equilibrium as long
as reputation has a value. Of course, promises can always be broken -
and will be broken - if it is in the interest of the candidate to do so.
Promises are kept only because it is in the interest of the candidate to do
so, since the future payoﬀs are diﬀerent for the candidate when he keeps his
promise than when he does not. Promises may change voters’ beliefs about
the choices that candidates will make if elected because voters understand
that it is sometimes in a candidate’s selfish interest to fulfill his promises,
even when there is a short-run gain from reneging. Voters also understand
that the threat of future punishment is not suﬃcient to deter all reneging:
some promises may be so far from a candidate’s preferred outcome that
9
the short-run gain from reneging is suﬃciently high that a candidate will
relinquish his electoral future. In short, the ability of a candidate to alter
voters’ beliefs is not a “technological” given, but rather, is an equilibrium
phenomenon.
We assume complete information: voters know candidates’ preferences
over policies perfectly at the time they vote.3 We assume that at each elec-
tion candidates’ reputation may be either good or bad: candidates with
good reputations are candidates who have never reneged in the past and
candidates with bad reputations are those who have reneged on a promise
sometime in the past.4 Voters believe only promises of candidates who
have a good reputation and never believe any promise of candidates who
have a bad reputation. After each election, a winning candidate with a
good reputation compares the one time benefit of reneging on any promise
he may have made with the value of maintaining his reputation by fulfilling
the promise. Candidates with a bad reputation choose their optimal policy
independent of their promises. Voters predict that candidates with a bad
reputation will implement their ideal policy regardless of any promises, and
that candidates with a good reputation will fulfill any promise that is not
3We will discuss later a variant of the model in which candidates preferences are not
known with certainty at the time of the election.
4Reputations need not have this ”all-or-nothing” property; we discuss below richer
possibilities of how past behavior can aﬀect reputation.
10
too costly to carry out, that is, for which the benefit of reneging is less than
the decrease in their continuation payoﬀs if they renege. These strategies
comprise a subgame perfect equilibrium. If there is no uncertainty, candi-
dates do not make promises they do not intend to keep since with complete
information, voters can predict they will renege and the promise will not
influence their voting.5
Candidates will be able to change voters’ beliefs about the policy they
will undertake as long as the discount factor is large enough. That is,
as long as the future has suﬃcient value, candidates will carry out their
promises when it is not too costly to do so. If there is a positive (expected)
value to being elected in each of the future periods, the value to retaining
a good reputation goes to infinity as the discount factor goes to one. For
high enough value to retaining a good reputation, all promises will be kept
(hence, believed by voters).
In these models there will always be one equilibrium in which campaign
promises are irrelevant: all candidates make random promises, and for all
messages they hear, voters do not alter their beliefs about a candidate’s
5Uncertainty (symmetric between voters and candidates) about what alternatives will
arise between the time of voting and the time at which the alternatives to the promise
action are known would change this. In that case one would expect that in equilibrium
some promises will not be kept when the benefits of reneging outweigh the value of
reputation.
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type or the choices he will make if elected. Candidates choose their most
preferred policy if elected. Here, the only information relevant to voters is
the candidate’s choice: their predictions of choice in the second period are
independent of any campaign promises, and hence reneging on campaign
promises cannot aﬀect voting in the second election.
What is interesting, however, is that in addition to this uninformative
equilibrium, there may be equilibria in which voters do change their be-
liefs about candidates and their voting behavior on the basis of campaign
promises.
Campaign promises matter if and only if candidates’ payoﬀs if they re-
nege on their campaign promises are diﬀerent from the payoﬀs they obtain
if they fulfill their promises. That is, we obtain diﬀerent election outcomes
following a failure to fulfill a promise than after a promise has been fulfilled.
For the outcome of future elections to diﬀer following fulfillment or non-
fulfillment of promises, voters’ strategies must depend on the relationship
between a campaign promise and the policy choice of a candidate: voters’
actions must depend on the candidates’ promises.
The set of payoﬀ-relevant equilibrium outcomes (i.e. sequences of elec-
tions and policies) of the repeated game analyzed in this paper is the same
as the set of equilibrium outcomes that one would obtain from a model
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without candidates making any campaign promises. Because of the com-
plete information, there is also an equilibrium without promises, which
duplicates this sequence of outcomes. In that other equilibrium, neither
candidates make an announcement, and the candidate whose promise in
the equilibrium with cheap talk would have been closer to the median
voter wins the election. The elected candidate then implements the pol-
icy that corresponds to the announcement he would have promised in the
corresponding cheap talk equilibrium. If a candidate is elected the voters
expect him to implement it, and he always does this. If not, the candidate
would be punished just as in the equilibrium with cheap talk. Since it was
a credible equilibrium with cheap talk, this means the elected candidate
would prefer to implement what would have been his campaign promise
and maintain a good reputation than implement his ideal point, getting a
bad reputation. Thus the role of promises in the equilibrium analyzed here
is primarily to coordinate on an equilibrium strategy for voters.
In general, candidates will not be able to induce all possible beliefs
in voters. We consider this an important feature of our approach. It
is endogenous which promises will be made, believed, and fulfilled when
both candidates and voters are fully rational. Each candidate will have
available to him only a subset of the possible beliefs voters might have
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about his policy choices if elected. It is important to note that the sets
of beliefs that candidates can induce in voters are typically quite diﬀerent,
since they depend on voters’ initial beliefs about the candidates, including
their discount factors, δ, utility functions, etc.6
2.1. The model
There are two candidates, L and R, who compete in all elections. At each
election, the structure of the game is as follows:
Campaign stage: both candidates simultaneously make an announce-
ment. Each candidate has to decide between making a promise about the
policy he will implement in case he wins the election or sending a message
devoid of promises.
Voting stage: each voter votes for the candidate who maximizes their
expected utility, which depends on the policy that he or she believes will
be implemented after the election.
Oﬃce stage: the winner of the election implements a policy.
Candidates and voters derive utility only from the policy implemented.
We assume that the utility an agent obtains from each election is repre-
sented by
6This construction provides a rational explanation for the exogenous cost of commit-
ment assumed in Banks (1990), for example.
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ui (x) = − |x− xi| .
where xi represents the ideal point of agent i.
The policy space is represented by the interval [−1, 1] .We assume that
the ideal point of the median voter is the same at all elections, and nor-
malized to be xm = 0.
Elections take place over time. Voters simply vote in each election for
the candidate whose predicted policy choice is most preferred.7 Candidates
discount future payoﬀs with a discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1). The discount
factor represents the weight that future payoﬀs have on candidates’ total
utility. We have in mind an interpretation of δ that combines both time
preference and the probability that a candidate will run for oﬃce in the
future. For example, we can think of it as δ = λβ, where λ ∈ [0, 1]
represents the probability that the candidate will run for oﬃce in any
period, and β ∈ [0, 1) represents time preference. Since the value of δ is
less than one, elections that are further away in the future have less eﬀect
on the total utility of the candidate than earlier elections.
We assume that the policy preferences of the two candidates change at
7We rule out the possibility that voters will “punish” candidates when it is not in
their interest to do for the same reasons that attention is restricted in games to subgame
perfect equilibria.
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each election. In particular, we assume that at each election the ideal point
of candidate L is xL ∈ [−1, 0] , given by an independent random draw from
a uniform probability distribution over [−1, 0] . Similarly at each election
the ideal point of candidate R is xR ∈ [0, 1] , given by an independent ran-
dom draw from a uniform probability distribution over [0, 1] . Candidates’
ideal points are drawn independently of each other and of past draws before
each election.
Candidates know the preferences of the median voter, and at the begin-
ning of each electoral period, voters and candidates learn the ideal points
of both candidates for that period.
A candidate’s strategy selects for each one period game a pair (p, x)
where x ∈ [−1, 1] represents the policy the candidate implements in case
he wins the election, and p ∈ [−1, 1]∪{∅} represents the announcement that
the candidate makes at the campaign stage (either a promised policy or
nothing). Formally, we may define a promise by the exact policy that will
be implemented, in which case, if a candidate promises policy x ∈ [0, 1] ,
he will break his promise only if he implements x0 6= x. We may also think
of a promise as the worst policy that will be implemented according to the
median voter’s preferences, that is if a candidate promises policy x ∈ [0, 1] ,
he will only break his promise if he implements x0 ∈ (x, 1] . In our model
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these definitions are equivalent.
Before deciding their vote, voters may update their beliefs about the
candidates’ policy choices in case they win the election, given the announce-
ments made at the campaign stage. Given their beliefs, voters decide to
vote for the candidate that maximizes their expected utility.
Since voters know the candidates’ ideal points, we assume that in the
absence of promises, voters believe that candidates will choose their ideal
point if elected. After the campaign stage voters may update their beliefs
about the policy choices the candidates would make if elected. Voters
decide rationally whether to believe the campaign promises or not. Voters
will only believe a promise if honoring it is compatible with the candidate’s
incentives after the election. Thus, even though campaign promises do not
aﬀect the payoﬀs of any of the agents, they may aﬀect their decisions.
2.2. Credible promises
We describe an equilibrium of this repeated game in which campaign
promises matter, in the sense that diﬀerent promises imply diﬀerent strat-
egy choices, and therefore lead to diﬀerent payoﬀs. In this equilibrium,
voters will believe the maximal set of incentive compatible promises, that
is, promises that the candidate would have an incentive to fulfill should
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he be elected. For a candidate with discount factor δ, we will show that
there is a number d(δ) such that voters will believe promises made by the
candidate if and only if the distance between the candidate’s ideal point
and his promise is not greater than d(δ). In the equilibrium we describe,
voters will believe all promises from a candidate for which the distance
from the candidate’s ideal point is not greater than d(δ) if the candidate
has never reneged on a promise and will believe no promise if he has ever
reneged (that is, implemented a policy other than a promised policy).8 If
the candidate makes a promise that is not incentive compatible or if he
makes no promise voters believe that he will implement his ideal point.
These strategies essentially treat candidates as one of two types. At
each election we may have candidates with a good reputation, who have
never reneged on any promises and whose (incentive compatible) promises
will be believed by voters, and candidates with a bad reputation, who have
reneged on a promise at some time in the past, and independently of what
promises they make at the campaign stage, voters will believe that if they
win the election they will implement their ideal point.
After the election the winner implements the policy that maximizes his
8There are other equilibria that can be thought of as intermediate cases in which
voters believe some, but not all, promises that are incentive compatible. The equilibria
in these cases will look like the equilibrium we describe, with a smaller d, that is, voters
believe fewer promises.
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expected payoﬀs, taking into account that the voters’ strategies for future
elections might depend on the candidate’s promises and choice. Thus at
this stage, candidates will compare the gains and costs of reneging. The
gains from reneging are represented by the instantaneous increase in their
utility produced by deviating from their promised policy, choosing instead
their ideal point. The costs of reneging are reflected in their expected
payoﬀs from future elections: the diﬀerence between the future expected
payoﬀs for a candidate with a good reputation and a candidate with a bad
reputation. A candidate will only renege on a promise if the instantaneous
gain is larger than his future expected loss.
In the equilibrium we describe, candidates will only make incentive
compatible promises and they will fulfill the promises they make. There-
fore, voters will believe the promises that are made and the winner will be
the candidate who is able to promise a policy closer to the median voter’s
ideal point. The winning candidate must promise a policy that is at least
as attractive to the median voter as his opponent’s policy. If the losing
candidate promises a policy that is consistent with incentive compatibility
and as close as possible to the median voter’s ideal point, the winning can-
didate will have to promise a policy that is at least as close to the median
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voter’s ideal point.9 Since we assume that the candidates’ ideal points are
on opposite sides of the median voter’s ideal point, when the winner makes
promises closer to the median voter’s ideal point, the losing candidate’s
utility increases. The candidates’ strategies in the equilibrium we describe
have the losing candidate promising the policy closest to the median voter’s
ideal point that is consistent with incentive compatibility, and the winning
candidate making a promise that is equally close.
Formally, the strategies for the equilibrium described are:
Candidates’ strategies:
(i) If neither candidate has ever reneged on a promise, the candidate
whose ideal point is further from the median voter’s ideal point promises
the policy that is closest to the median voter’s ideal point consistent with
incentive compatibility. The candidate whose ideal point is closer to the
median voter’s ideal point promises a policy that is equally attractive to the
median voter. If elected, both candidates fulfill their promise.
(ii) If both candidates have reneged on a promise in the past, both can-
didates promise to implement the median voter’s ideal point. If elected,
9 If candidate A is promising the policy that is as close as possible to the median
voter’s ideal point and it is consistent with incentive compatibility, and candidate B
has an incentive compatible promise that is closer, candidate B will win the election.
However, the set of incentive compatible promises that are strictly preferred by the
median voter is open. We assume that candidate B is the winning candidate in this case.
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they implement their own ideal point.
(iii) If one candidate has reneged on a promise but the other candidate
has never reneged, the candidate who has reneged promises to implement
the median voter’s ideal point. If elected, he implements his own ideal point.
The candidate who has not reneged promises a policy that is as attractive
to the median voter as the opponent’s ideal point, if such a promise is
incentive compatible. If that policy is not incentive compatible, he promises
his ideal point. If elected, he fulfills his promise.
Voters’ strategies:
Each voter casts his or her vote for the candidate whose expected policy,
if elected, maximizes the voter’s utility. Voters’ beliefs are as follows.
(i) Voters believe that incentive compatible promises of candidates who
have never reneged on a promise will be fulfilled.
(ii) Voters believe that a candidate who makes a promise that is not
incentive compatible will implement his ideal point.
(iii) Voters believe that a candidate who has reneged on a promise in
the past, will implement his ideal point.
Proposition 1: The strategies described above constitute an equilib-
rium. The promises believed and fulfilled in equilibrium with linear utility
functions are those within a distance dD (δ) of the candidates’ ideal points,
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where
dD (δ) =



0 if 0 ≤ δ ≤ 12
3
2
µ
1−
q
4−5δ
3δ
¶
if 12 ≤ δ ≤
3
4
1 if 34 ≤ δ ≤ 1
The proof is in the appendix.
The distance dD (δ) characterizes an equilibrium with the maximal
range of incentive compatible promises. We obtain that, in the equilib-
rium we have analyzed, candidates who have never reneged on a promise
fulfill all the promises they make, and voters believe these promises: both
candidates maintain a good reputation over time. There is a continuum
of equilibria with similar characteristics: for all d ≤ dD (δ) , there is an
equilibrium in which voters believe promises up to a distance d away from
the candidate’s ideal point.
Our analysis yields some simple but interesting comparative statics.
Notice that the maximal promise believed in equilibrium is an increasing
function of the discount factor, since ∂dD (δ) /∂δ = 1/δ2
p
3δ/ (4− 5δ) ≥ 0.
Thus, as the discount factor increases, the value of reputation (the cost of
reneging) increases, and it implies that larger promises will be kept and
believed in equilibrium.
In general, we should expect to see that candidates with high probabil-
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ity of running for oﬃce in the future are more likely to fulfill their promises
and voters are more likely to believe promises from these candidates. Thus
promises are more likely to be believed at the same time that candidates
are more likely to make them.
A particularly interesting consequence of this is that, all else equal, two
candidate systems have an advantage over multi-candidate systems. In the
latter, the average candidate clearly has lower chance of being elected in
future elections, and hence has lower value for maintaining a reputation.
This lower value of reputation makes fewer promises credible, with the
result that there will be less mediating eﬀect of credible promises and,
hence, implemented policies with more candidates.10
Similarly, all else equal, younger candidates are more likely to fulfill
their promises, since they have a longer time horizon to consider, and
thus their reputation is more valuable. However, there may be things like
seniority eﬀects that cause younger candidates to have smaller chances of
being elected in the future. This would work in the opposite direction.
Note that the expected value of maintaining a good reputation for a
candidate is the same independently of whether his opponent has a good
or a bad reputation, that is
10We thank Abhijit Banerjee for this observation.
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vGG
¡
dS (δ)
¢
− vBG
¡
dS (δ)
¢
= vGB
¡
dS (δ)
¢
− vBB
¡
dS (δ)
¢
.
That the value of a good reputation is independent of the opponent’s rep-
utation is due to the assumed linearity of the utility functions.
We also analyze the eﬀects of maintaining a good reputation on the
welfare of the median voter. The median voter’s expected utility from
each election as a function of the credible promises in equilibrium is given
by:
uGG (d) = −
1
3
+ d2
µ
1− 2
3
d
¶
> −1
3
uBB (d) = uGB (d) = uBG (d) = −
1
3
With ∂uGG (d) /∂d > 0 for 0 ≤ d ≤ 1. Thus, the median voter is better
oﬀ when both candidates have a good reputation because all promises
are made toward the median voter’s ideal point. In equilibrium, both
candidates have a good reputation and the utility of the median voter
increases with the size of the set of credible promises.
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The probability that a voter is better oﬀ when candidates can make
credible promises than when no promises are credible decreases with the
absolute value of the ideal point of the voter. In particular this implies
that the voter most favored by the credibility of promises is the median
voter (xm = 0). Voters with ideal points at the extremes of the policy
space obtain the same expected utility when both candidates have a good
reputation as when both candidates have a bad reputation. The reason is
that for each realization of the candidates’ ideal points such that a voter’s
utility decreases when some promises are credible, there is another realiza-
tion (symmetric) of the candidates’ ideal points such that the voters’ utility
increases by the same amount when promises are credible. Thus, voters’
utility can only increase with the size of the set of credible promises.
2.3. Extension to concave utility functions
Up to now we have assumed that the utility function of the candidates
was linear with respect to the distance between their ideal point and the
implemented policy. In this section we will assume that this function is
concave. Formally we assume that for all i
Ui (x) = − |xi − x|k
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where k ≥ 1 measures the degree of concavity, that is, the larger the value
of k the larger the degree of concavity. A candidate with a strictly concave
utility function, k > 1, suﬀers more than candidate with a linear utility
function (k = 1) from the implementation of policies that are far away from
his ideal point. In a sense, the degree of concavity of the utility function
is a measure of the intensity of the candidate’s political preferences.
We should expect that the value of maintaining a good reputation for
a candidate is larger the larger the degree of concavity of his preferences,
since his utility loss from losing an election increases with the degree of
concavity, while his utility when he wins (even with a promise diﬀerent
from his ideal point) is aﬀected less. In this section we replicate the above
equilibrium analysis when candidates’ utility functions are concave. We
assume that both candidates’ utility exhibit the same degree of concavity.
We find that the set of credible campaign promises is larger the higher the
degree of concavity of the candidates’ utility functions.
Proposition 2: The strategies described in section 3.2 constitute an
equilibrium. The promises believed and fulfilled in equilibrium with concave
utility functions are those within a distance edD (δ, k) of the candidates’
ideal points, where
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edD (δ, k) =



0 if δ = 0
0 <edD (δ, k)< 1 if 0 < δ < 1
1+
2k[3−(1−dS)k+2]−k−3
(k+1)(k+2)
1 if 1
1+
2k[3−(1−dS)k+2]−k−3
(k+1)(k+2)
≤ δ
and
∂
³edD ³δ, k, edS´´
∂k
≥ 0.
The proof is in the appendix.
When we assumed that the candidates’ utility functions were linear, we
saw that their expected utilities were unaﬀected by the kind of reputation
that they had as long as both candidates had the same kind of reputation.
When both candidates have a good reputation, it is equally likely that a
given candidate will be helped or hurt by his reputation. When a candi-
date’s ideal point is closer to the median voter, he will win whether both
candidates have a good or a bad reputation. When both candidates have a
good reputation, in equilibrium he will make a promise, and hence be worse
oﬀ than if both have had a bad reputation, in which case he could have won
by promising his ideal point. On the other hand, if his opponent’s ideal
point is closer to the median voter, this candidate benefits from having a
good reputation. With linear utility functions, these exactly oﬀset, and the
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candidates’ expected utility when both candidates have a good reputation
is the same as when neither does.
With concave utility functions, this is no longer the case. When both
candidates have a good reputation, the equilibrium policies enacted will
be closer to the median voter than they would be if both candidates had
a bad reputation. This convergence toward the median voter is beneficial
to candidates, however, with strictly concave utility functions. When a
candidate is forced to move his policy choice toward the median voter’s
ideal point because both candidates have a good reputation, the loss is
not as large as the gain he gets from his opponent’s doing the same thing.
Hence, with concave utility functions, candidates’ expected utility is larger
when both candidates have a good reputation than when both candidates
have a bad reputation, and the greater the degree of concavity, the greater
the diﬀerence between the two.
Candidates’ welfare increases in our model because of the policy con-
vergence that a good reputation generates. The eﬀect is similar to the
welfare increase that results from policy convergence in Alesina (1988) and
Dixit, Grossman and Gul (2000). In those papers, policy convergence arises
through tacit cooperation between two parties that moderate their policies
when in oﬃce. Although the welfare benefits in these papers, as in our
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paper, are due to policy convergence, the policy convergence that we ob-
tain when we assume linear utility functions stems from the interactions
between the voters and the candidates, rather than between the candidates
themselves.
2.4. Extension to random median voters
In the model analyzed in the previous sections of this paper we assume
that the ideal points of the candidates change from election to election
and that the ideal point of the median voter does not change over time.
These assumptions can be interpreted as if voters had stable preferences
but the issues changed from election to election. For instance, in one
period the main campaign issue, and therefore the candidates’ promises,
are on tax reform, the next election the issue is abortion, etc. At each
election the ideal point of the median voters is normalized to be zero, and
the candidates’ ideal points are diﬀerent reflecting the diﬀerent relative
positions of all agents for each specific issue. In one sense, this can be
thought of as a model of short-term policies.
In this section we describe an alternative model in which the policies can
be thought of as long-term policies. Here we assume that candidates’ ideal
points are fixed at all elections, and that the ideal point of the median voter
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changes across elections. This variation of the model can be interpreted as
the candidates having long run, stable ideal points over some policy, say
income distribution. The assumption that the ideal point of the median
voter is random captures the idea that the median voter may change over
time due to demographic changes or that individual voters’ preferences
may change due to changes in the economy.
Consider the following variant of the model described previously, where
the ideal points of the candidates are xL = 0 and xR = 1 at each election,
and the ideal point of the median voterm at each election is an independent
realization of a uniform random variable on the interval [0, 1] . Notice that
here the ideal points of the candidates are not independent, in contrast to
what was assumed in the previous sections.
Proposition 3: The strategies described in section 3.2 constitute an
equilibrium. The promises believed and fulfilled in equilibrium with a ran-
dom median voter are those within a distance dD (δ) of the candidates’
ideal points, where
dD (δ) =



0 if δ ≤ 23
23δ−2
δ
if 23 ≤ δ ≤
4
5
1 if 45 ≤ δ
The proof is in the appendix.
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In this extension of the basic model, we again obtain that the maximal
promise depends on the discount factor in a very natural way: when the
discount factor is very small, no promises are believed in equilibrium; for
larger values of the discount factor more promises are believed in equilib-
rium, and when the discount factor is suﬃciently large, all promises are
believed.
Thus, the results obtained with this alternative formalization of the two
candidate electoral competition are qualitative the same as the results we
found when we assumed that the candidates’ ideal points were randomly
determined at each election and the median voter’s ideal point was fixed
at all elections.
The welfare eﬀects in this case are similar to those in the previous sec-
tion. As in that case, the median voter is strictly better oﬀ when candidates
have reputations. When the candidates have linear utility functions, they
are equally well oﬀ when both or neither have reputations; with strictly
concave utility functions, they will be better oﬀ when both have reputa-
tions than when neither does.
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2.5. Extension to multidimensional policy space
The logic and intuition of the results above carries over to the multidimen-
sional policy case. We discuss here the two dimensional case where voters
and candidates have Euclidean preferences, where each voter or candidate
has an ideal point with utility a decreasing function of Euclidean distance
from their ideal point. The voters’ ideal points are distributed such that
there is a global median. For concreteness, suppose there is a continuum
of voters, with ideal points uniformly distributed on a rectangle, so the
global median is simply the individual whose ideal point is the center of
the rectangle. For any two policies chosen by the candidates, each voter
will prefer the policy that is closer to his or her ideal point. The policy
that is preferred by the median voter will be preferred by a majority of the
voters (that is, by more than one half of the voters).
In each period, the candidates ideal points are drawn from the uniform
distribution on the rectangle; the candidates’ ideal points are independent
of each other and independent across elections. As before, suppose that
each candidate can make promises and those promises will be believed if
they are incentive compatible and if the candidate has never reneged on
a promise in the past, and will not be believed if he has ever reneged.
It is straightforward to see that for a candidate who has never reneged,
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there is a maximum distance from his ideal point that he can promise that
is incentive compatible, with that distance determined by the net present
value of being able to make promises in future periods.
The Nash equilibrium of the repeated game of promises between can-
didates follows the same logic as in one dimension. As in one dimension,
generally one of the candidates is closer to the median and the other is
further away. Call the latter candidate the loser. There can’t be an equi-
librium with the loser making a less than maximal promise when they both
have good reputations, for exactly the same reason as in one dimension.
The equilibrium is illustrated in figure 1. On the equilibrium path, the
loser adopts the closest possible credible policy to the median voter, along
the line segment between the loser’s ideal point, B, and the median voter’s
ideal point, V . The policy is labeled B0. The other candidate "matches" by
adopting the (unique) policy on the line segment between that candidate’s
ideal point, A, and V . The policy is labeled A0. Although indiﬀerent, the
voter votes for A0, using the same justification as in the one dimensional
case.11
The two dimensional case has an interesting feature that is absent in
11That is, A could make an arbitrarily small move toward V in his promise, which
B could not credibly match. This would make the voter strictly prefer candidate A to
candidate B. Rather than try to model this formally, we simply assume the "better"
candidate wins in case of a tie.
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one dimension. If there were a diﬀerent timing structure in the game, the
losing candidate might gain by making a promise that induces his opponent
to counter-promise something other than A0 that the loser prefers to A0.
With simultaneous moves, such manipulation is not possible, but it would
be if B could irrevocably make a promise before A.
Figure 2 illustrates a case in which the optimal “manipulative” promise
for the losing candidate is not the maximal incentive compatible promise
that he could make. Suppose B0 is the largest incentive compatible promise
that B can make, inducing A to make promise A0. But inducing A to make
promise A0 is not the best that B can do. As A makes promises closer to
V to win the election, the outcome moves from point A (if A could win
without making any promise) toward V ’s ideal point. The move along this
line initially increases B’s utility, as movements along the line AV initially
lead to outcomes that are closer to B. However, once A makes promises
greater than M , the move along the line AV leads to outcomes that are
further from B, thus B is worse oﬀ. If B were to scale down his promise
to B00 (prior to A making his promise), A’s response would be to scale
back his promise to M , which is the point on the line AV that gives B the
highest utility.
>From this, it is easy to see that with this kind of manipulation, there
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may be no promises at all.12 If the lines AB and AV form an obtuse
angle, any movement along the line AV reduces B’s utility, hence the loser
would be better oﬀ making no promise, rather than making the equilibrium
promise. The analog of this in the one dimensional case is when both
candidates are on the same side of the median voter. In the absence of any
promises, the candidate whose ideal point is closer to the median will win
the election. The only promises that the candidate whose ideal point is
further from the median voter’s ideal point can make that have any eﬀect
are promises of outcomes that are closer to the median voter’s ideal point
than his rival’s ideal point, but movements in this direction are to the
candidate’s detriment.
The arguments above carry over generally to any number of dimensions,
provided a global median exists. If a global median fails to exist, then there
is still always an equilibrium in which no promises are made (and none
believed), and the winning candidate simply implements his ideal point.
This suggests that equilibria with small but positive promises will exist
when δ is positive.
12This kind of manipulation is in the spirit of the Stackelberg equilibrium. Of course,
the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous move game will always have the loser making
a maximal promise, as shown before.
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2.5.1. Asymmetry of issues
The discussion above treats the case in which all parties have circular
indiﬀerence curves. Suppose the issues are not symmetric, that is, that the
voters’ utility functions are given by U(x, y) = −a2(x − x¯)2 − b2(y − y¯)2.
One can make a change of variables with x˜ = x
a
and y˜ = y
b
, so that
U(x˜, y˜) = −(x˜− x¯)2− (y˜− y¯)2. If it is assumed that the voters’ ideal points
in the space of changed variables is uniform, the analysis above carries
over more or less intact. As before voters will choose the candidate whose
(incentive compatible) promise is closer to their ideal point. There is one
diﬀerence, however. If the candidates do not have the same utility function
as the voters (i.e., if the a and b parameters in their utility function are not
the same as in the voters’ utility functions), their indiﬀerence curves after
the change of variables will not be circles, but rather ellipses. The promises
that will be made by a candidate will still be on the locus of tangencies of
the indiﬀerence curves of the candidate with the indiﬀerence curve of the
voter, but this locus will no longer be a straight line.
3. Discussion
There are several features of this model that deserve further discussion.
The eﬀect of candidate ideology on credibility: How does intensity
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of candidates’ ideology aﬀect the credibility of the candidates? Our results
above assumed that the candidates’ ideal points were uniformly distributed
on the unit interval. Imagine instead environments in which there is more
polarization between the candidates as captured by distributions of ideal
points that put greater weight on points further from the median voter. The
parameter d measured the magnitude of candidates’ credibility in section
2.2 above; we are interested in whether this parameter would increase or
decrease when there is greater polarization as described above.
Suppose we symmetrically change the distributions of the candidates’
ideal points, putting greater weight on points further from the median voter
and less on points nearer. As before, it will still be the case that a candidate
is more likely to win an election when his reputation is intact than when he
has lost his reputation. The candidate whose reputation is intact benefits
from this. Sometimes that benefit will come about when the candidates
ideal points are relatively close to the median voter’s, and sometimes when
they are farther away from the median voter. The magnitude of the benefit
of the reputation will be greater when the ideal points are further away,
simply because the distance between the ideal points is larger in this case.
But then the eﬀect of an increase in ideological intensity is to put greater
probability on those cases where the benefit is larger, hence the value of
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having a reputation is greater with the increase.
The increased value of having a reputation when there is greater ideo-
logical intensity translates into an increase in the potential credibility. Not
all promises are typically believed by voters; what they will (can) believe is
limited by what the candidate has to lose by reneging after being elected.
Anything that increases the value of maintaining one’s reputation increases
the loss to the candidate should he renege, and consequently, increases the
magnitude of the promises that he will have an incentive to keep.
Uncertainty: Suppose that between the voting stage and the oﬃce stage
the policy preferences of the winner suﬀer a shock that changes the can-
didate’s ideal point with some positive probability. In the case analyzed
in the previous section, all promises made by a candidate during the cam-
paign were fulfilled in equilibrium. Adding uncertainty about the candi-
dates’ preferences alters this: we will then have that some promises that
are believed in equilibrium will not be fulfilled. Furthermore, larger proba-
bility of shocks on candidates’ preferences should also imply a lower future
expected value from maintaining a good reputation (since with positive
probability it will be lost in any case), thus a lower value of reputation
(lower cost of reneging), and therefore in equilibrium we will obtain a
smaller d : fewer promises will be credible.
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Alternative Punishment strategies: We have assumed that voters’
punishment of candidates who renege is extreme: after a candidate reneges
once voters keep the punishment of not believing any of his promises for
all future elections. There are other equilibria in which voters’ punishment
is less extreme. We could think that after a candidate reneges once, voters
apply the same punishment to the candidate for a finite number of periods,
and believe his incentive compatible promises afterwards. Since the future
expected payoﬀs if he reneges will be higher in equilibrium we will obtain
a lower value for maintaining reputation, and therefor a smaller d, that is,
fewer promises will be credible.
Endogenous Entry We have assumed that candidate ideal points are
exogenous. A natural extension of the model would be to incorporate en-
dogenous entry of candidates. One possible approach would be to combine
the random median voter model of section 2.4 with the citizen candidate
approach of Besley and Coate (1997) and Osborne and Slivinski (1996). In
the citizen candidate model, there is a cost, c, to entry, and each citizen
simultaneously makes a choice to either pay c and become a candidate, or
not. Then an election occurs between the candidates. As is the case in our
model, the citizen candidate approach assumes that candidates have policy
preferences so that in a single-election world no promises are credible. In
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principle, one could extend the citizen candidate approach to a repeated
elections setting, including a campaign promise stage in each election. This
could lead to interesting dynamic interactions between current promises by
incumbents and endogenous entry of challengers in later elections. Such an
extension, however, is not straightforward. The benefit to an individual of
making a promise in a given period and subsequently carrying out or reneg-
ing on the promise depends on the past history of promises by all other
agents. Thus, the resulting interaction is a dynamic game where the state
variable is a vector summarizing all agents’ promise histories. Restricting
attention to endogenous entry, as we have done, dramatically simplies the
analysis.
Forward Looking Voters: We have assumed voters are myopic, and do
not take into account the future. If voters, like candidates, discount the
future, then the equilibria we have characterized continue to be equilibria.
Voters will still in each period choose the candidate who oﬀers the preferred
platform, since there is no link between what platform is promised, and/or
enacted, except to the extent that promises are broken. Some additional
equilibria are possible if the voters not only discounted the future but were
more strategic than in our model. While we do not carry out the analysis,
we will outline the logic. When voters are strategic, they can induce can-
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didates to make even better promises. In our model, the winning (more
moderate) candidate only has to oﬀer the median voter a platform with
the same utility as that oﬀered by the losing (more extreme) candidate.
A strategic forward-looking voter might adopt a strategy that requires the
more moderate candidate to make an even better (credible) promise, or suf-
fer a bad reputation, with the losing (more extreme) candidate still always
making the maximum promise, as in our analysis. In equilibrium, this
would reduce the value to a candidate of maintaining a reputation, and
therefore would decrease the maximal promise that can be sustained, so
the voters would face a trade-oﬀ. On the one hand, they would receive the
maximal promise from the more moderate candidate every period, whereas
in our model, they get strictly less than that each period since the mod-
erate candidate only matches the extreme candidate’s promise. On the
other hand, the maximal promise is less, so when the two candidates have
ideal points that are nearly the same distance from the median voter, the
median voter is worse oﬀ. There are many subgame perfect equilibria of
this sort, and in principle one could compute the best equilibrium from the
standpoint of the (strategic) median voter.
Standard preferences: Voters and candidates in our model have stan-
dard preferences, that is, they care about the policies that will be chosen.
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One might argue that there are honest politicians and dishonest politicians,
and that voters have a preference for honest politicians. It is certainly
plausible that politicians diﬀer in the degree to which prefer to keep their
word, and that voters care about this. Candidates’ behavior in a model
that incorporated these ingredients would be similar to their behavior in
our model: they would hesitate to make promises that they did not intend
to keep, and voters would be less likely to vote for candidates who have
reneged on promises in the past.
A disadvantage of such a model is the introduction of additional argu-
ments in candidates’ and voters’ utility functions. It is relatively easy to
explain a particular phenomenon by adding parameters to a model. For-
mal modelling has been successful because a single parsimonious model is
able to account for a wide range of phenomena. Even if one thought that
candidates do have preferences for keeping their word and voters do have
a taste for honest politicians, it is valuable to know the extent to which
the campaign promises that politicians make and fulfill can be understood
within the standard model without adding these.
4. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
42
In order to find equilibrium strategies for the two candidates we will
consider three diﬀerent cases: when both candidates have a bad reputation,
when only one of the candidates has a good reputation, and when both have
a good reputation.
Suppose that both candidates have a bad reputation. In this case, given
that voters do not believe any promises (other than the candidates’ ideal
points) the cost of reneging is zero since no promises will be believed in
any case, therefore at the ’oﬃce stage’ all candidates will always implement
their ideal points. Similarly, given that the only promise that is incentive
compatible for the candidates is their own ideal point, it is optimal for
the voters not to believe any other promise. Thus, we have that at each
election the winner will be the candidate whose ideal point is closer to the
ideal point of the median voter (zero) and the policy implemented after the
election will be his ideal point. In this case, the expected payoﬀ (prior to
the realization of the candidates’ ideal points) for each candidate at each
election is given by (see figure A.1):
vBB =
Z 1
0
Z −xR
−1
uL (xR) dxLdxR +
Z 1
0
Z 0
−xR
uL (xL) dxLdxR = −
1
2
.
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Now suppose that candidate R has a bad reputation, which means that
voters will believe that he will implement his ideal point, and candidate L
has a good reputation, that is, voters believe all promises he makes that
are consistent with the incentive compatibility constraints.
We start by assuming that voters believe all promises made by candi-
date L that are less than a distance d from his ideal point. Then, solving
for the equilibrium strategies, we will find the maximal d that is consistent
with incentive compatibility.
If −xL < xR, candidate L wins by promising his ideal point. In this
case, he does not need to make any promises, and obtains the maximal
possible utility.
If −xL > xR, candidate L loses if he does not make any promise or
if he cannot credibly promise a policy that is closer to the ideal point of
the median voter than xR. In this case candidate R wins the election and
implements xR. Otherwise, candidate Lmay credibly promise a policy −xR
that, for the median voter is at least as good as xR. Making a promise that
allows him to win the election is a better strategy for L than allowing R to
win, since he gets a higher utility even if he decides to fulfill his promise:
uL (−xR) = xL + xR > uL (xR) = xL − xR.
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Thus, in equilibrium candidate L promises policy −xR. Voters will
believe him only if he has a good reputation, and if implementing −xR is
incentive compatible for candidate L, that is, if the gain he obtains from
fulfilling his promise in terms of future expected payoﬀs is larger than the
cost of reneging. In this case candidate L wins the election13.
The cost of reneging is the diﬀerence between his future expected payoﬀ
if he maintains a good reputation, and his future expected payoﬀ if he loses
his reputation, given that candidate R does not have a good reputation.
Let vGB (d) denote the one-election expected utility for a candidate that
has a good reputation when his opponent has a bad reputation. Similarly
let vBB (d) denote the one-election expected utility for each candidate when
both have a bad reputation. Thus, given the assumptions of our model they
yield to (see figure A.2):
vGB (d) =
R 1−d
0
R −xR−d
−1 uL (xR) dxLdxR+
R 1−d
0
R −xR
−xR−d uL (−xR) dxLdxR
+
R 1
1−d
R −xR
−1 uL (−xR) dxLdxR+
R 1
0
R 0
−xR uL (xL) dxLdxR = −
1
6−
(1−d)3
3
vBB (d) =
R 1
0
R −xR
−1 uL (xR) dxLdxR +
R 1
0
R 0
−xR uL (xL) dxLdxR = −
1
2
Given the one-election expected payoﬀs, we can compute the expected
future payoﬀs for a candidate with a good reputation, given that his oppo-
13Observe that when candidate L promises −xR the median voter is indiﬀerent be-
tween the two candidates. We assume that when a voter is indiﬀerent between the two
candidates he votes for the unconstrained candidate.
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nent has a bad reputation:
VGB (d; δ) =
∞X
t=1
δtvGB (d) .
Similarly the future expected payoﬀs for a candidate with a bad reputation
given that his opponent also has a bad reputation are:
VBB (d; δ) =
∞X
t=1
δtvBB (d) .
Thus we obtain the cost of reneging as a function of the maximal
promise believed by voters and the discount factor. Let CS (d; δ) denote
the cost of reneging. Then we have that
CS (d; δ) = VGB (d; δ)− VBB (d; δ) =
δ
1− δ
1
3
³
1− (1− d)3
´
.
The gain from reneging: the maximal gain a candidate may obtain
from reneging of a promise is d, that is the maximal diﬀerence in utility
between implementing the policy he promised and implementing his ideal
point. Therefore, it is an optimal strategy for candidate L to fulfill all
promises that are at most at a distance d from his ideal point, where d
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satisfies d ≤ CS (d; δ)
It is also an optimal strategy for the voters to believe all promises that
are at most at a distance d from the candidate’s ideal point, with d such
that d ≤ CS (d; δ), since in equilibrium they will be fulfilled.
We denote by dS the value of d that solves
d = CS (d; δ) .
dS is the maximal promise that a candidate will always fulfill, and it is also
the maximal promise that voters will believe.
Since ∂CS (d) /∂d = [δ/ (1− δ)] (1− d)2 ≥ 0 and ∂CS (0) /∂d = δ/ (1− δ)
we have that in equilibrium (see figure A.3):
i) for δ ≤ 12 we must have dS = 0, no promises are believed
ii) for 12 < δ <
3
4 we must have 0 < d
S < 1, some promises may be
believed
iii) for 34 ≤ δ ≤ 1 we must have dS = 1, all promises may be believed.
Thus the promises that in equilibrium may be believed and fulfilled are:
dS (δ) =



0 if 0 ≤ δ ≤ 12
3
2
µ
1−
q
4−5δ
3δ
¶
if 12 ≤ δ ≤
3
4
1 if 34 ≤ δ ≤ 1
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Notice that since ∂2CS (d) /∂d2 = −2 [δ/ (1− δ)] (1− d) ≤ 0 we have
that the cost of reneging is a concave function. This is intuitively plausi-
ble since a candidate only benefits from an increase of the set of credible
promises, that is, an increase in dS (δ), when his ideal point is more than
a distance dS (δ) from the median voter’s ideal point, and the probability
of this event is lower the larger the value of dS (δ) .
Now consider the case in which both candidates have a good reputation.
Let vGG (d) denote the one election expected utility for a candidate that has
a good reputation when both candidates have a good reputation. Similarly
let vBG (d) denote the one election expected utility for a candidate who
has a bad reputation when his opponent has a good reputation. As before
we start by assuming that voters believe all promises that are at most a
distance d away from the ideal point of the candidate. We then look for
a function dD (δ) that characterizes the maximal promise that candidates
will fulfill and voters will believe if both candidates have a good reputation.
When both candidates have a good reputation, that is, both candidates can
make credible promises, the maximal promise that is incentive compatible
could be diﬀerent than the one we found in the case in which only one
candidate can make credible promises. Given the assumptions of our model,
we have (see figure A.4):
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vGG (d) =
R 1−d
0
R −xR−d
−1 uL (xR) dxLdxR +
R 1
d
R 0
−xR+d uL (xL) dxLdxR+R d
0
R 0
−d uL (0) dxLdxR +
R 1
d
R −xR+d
−xR uL (−xR + d) dxLdxR+R −d
−1
R −xL
−xL−d uL (−xL − d) dxRdxL = −
1
2
vBG (d) =
R 1
0
R −xR
−1 uL (xR) dxLdxR +
R 1
dS
R −xR+dS
−xR uL (−xL) dxLdxR+R dS
0
R 0
−xR uL (−xL) dxLdxR+
R 1
dS
R 0
−xR+dS uL (xL) dxLdxR = −
5
6+
(1−dS)
3
3
In this case the future expected payoﬀ for a candidate who has a good
reputation when the other candidate also has a good reputation is:
VGG (d; δ) =
δ
1− δ vGG (d) = −
1
2
δ
1− δ .
Observe that when both candidates have a good reputation, their pay-
oﬀs are independent of the size of the set of credible promises. This is
due to the linearity of the candidates’ utility functions: in expectation the
increase in utility that a candidate receives because his opponent can make
promises compensates for the lose in utility he obtains from fulfilling his
promises. Similarly, the future expected payoﬀ for a candidate who has a
bad reputation when his opponent has a good reputation is
VBG (d; δ) =
δ
1− δ vBG
¡
dS
¢
=
δ
1− δ
Ã
−5
6
+
¡
1− dS
¢3
3
!
.
Observe that the expected future payoﬀ for a candidate with a bad
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reputation when his opponent has a good reputation is a function of the
maximal promise that voters believe when only one candidate can make
promises, that is the value dS (δ) that we found for the previous case, while
the expected future payoﬀs for a candidate with a good reputation when
his opponent also has a good reputation is independent of d. Thus when
both candidates have a good reputation the cost of reneging for a candidate
is given by
CD (d; δ) = VGG (d; δ)− VBG (d; δ) =
δ
1− δ
1
3
³
1−
¡
1− dS
¢3´
.
Comparing this cost with the results found for the case in which only
one candidate has a good reputation we conclude that (see figure A.5):
CD (d; δ) = CS
¡
dS ; δ
¢
= dS (δ) .
That is, the cost of reputation when both candidates have a good repu-
tation equals the value of maintaining a good reputation for a candidate
when his opponent has a bad reputation, therefore it is equal to the maxi-
mal promise that voters believe when only one candidate has a good rep-
utation. This implies that we must have dD (δ) = dS (δ) , that is, if both
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candidates have a good reputation, the maximal promises that are going
to be fulfilled by candidates and believed by voters in equilibrium are the
same as in the case in which only one candidate has a good reputation. ¨
Proof of Proposition 2
We first consider the case in which both candidates have a bad repu-
tation. As before, since no promises are ever believed by voters, the cost
of reneging is zero and therefore at the oﬃce stage all candidates always
implement their ideal point. At each election the winner will be the can-
didate whose ideal point is closer to the median voter’s ideal point. The
expected payoﬀ (prior to the realization of the candidates’ ideal points) for
each candidate at each election is given by:
evBB (k) = Z 1
0
Z −xR
−1
− (xR − xL)k dxLdxR =
1− 2k+1
(k + 1) (k + 2)
Observe that the expected payoﬀ in this case is strictly decreasing with
the degree of concavity of the candidates’ utility function:
∂evBB (k)
∂k
=
2k+1 [2k + 3− (k + 1) (k + 2) ln 2]− (2k + 3)
(k + 1)2 (k + 2)2
< 0
Now suppose that candidate L has a good reputation and candidate R
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has a bad reputation. As before, we first assume that voters believe all
promises made by candidate L that are less than a distance d from his
ideal point, and we then determine the maximal d that is consistent with
incentive compatibility.
The gain from reneging : the maximal gain that a candidate may obtain
from reneging on a promise is dk, that is, the maximal diﬀerence in util-
ity between implementing the promised policy and implementing his ideal
point.
The cost of reneging is the diﬀerence between his future expected payoﬀ
if he maintains a good reputation, and his future expected payoﬀ if he loses
his reputation, given that candidate R has a bad reputation. In this case
we have that the one-election expected utility for candidate L in this case
is:
evGB (d; k) = R 1−d0 R −xR−d−1
− (xR − xL)k dxLdxR +
R 1−d
0
R −xR
−xR−d− (−xR − xL)
k
dxLdxR
+
R 1
1−d
R −xR
−1 − (−xR − xL)
k
dxLdxR
=
− 1
2
(2−d)k+2−3
2
dk+2+1
(k+1)(k+2) −
dk+1(1−d)
k+1
As before, given the one-election expected payoﬀs, we can compute
the expected future payoﬀs for a candidate with a good reputation given
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his opponent reputation, and then compute the cost of reneging as the
diﬀerence between them:
eCS (d; δ, k) = eVGB (d; δ, k)− eVBB (d; δ, k) = ∞X
t=1
δt [evGB (d; k)− evBB (k)] .
When both candidates’ utility functions are concave we have that the
cost of reneging is given by the following expression:
eCS (d; δ, k) = δ
1− δ (evGB (d; k)− evBB (k))
=
δ
1− δ


1
2
h
2k+2 − (2− d)k+2 − 3dk+2
i
(k + 1) (k + 2)
− d
k+1 (1− d)
k + 1


Therefore, it is optimal for candidate L to fulfill all promises that are
at most a distance d from his ideal point, where d satisfies:
dk ≤ eCS (d; δ, k) .
It is also optimal for the voters to believe all promises that are at most
a distance d that satisfy the previous inequality, since in equilibrium they
will be fulfilled.
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Observe that the cost of reneging is increasing with the amount of
promises believed by voters14:
∂ eCS (d; δ, k)
∂d
=
δ
1− δ


1
2
h
(2− d)k+1 − dk+1
i
(k + 1)
− dk (1− d)

 ≥ 0.
The cost of reneging is also a concave function of the amount of promises
believed by voters:
∂2 eCS (d; δ, k)
∂d2
=
δ
1− δ
·
−1
2
(2− d)k + 1
2
dk − kdk−1 (1− d)
¸
≤ 0.
On the other hand, the gains from reneging, dk, are an increasing and
convex function of the amount of promises believed by voters.
Since eCS (0; δ, k) = 0 and
eCS (1; δ, k) = δ
1− δ
2k+1 − 2
(k + 1) (k + 2)
≤ 1 iff δ ≤ 1
1 + 2
k+1−2
(k+1)(k+2)
.
14Since ∂
eCS(d;δ,1)
∂d =
δ
1−δ (1− d)
2 ≥ 0 and
∂
µ
∂ eCS(d;δ,k)
∂d
¶
∂k =
δ
1−δ
·
1
2
(2−d)k+1[(k+1) ln(2−d)−1]+ 1
2
dk+1[1−(k+1) ln d]
(k+1)2 − d
k (1− d) ln d
¸
> 0
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This implies that the cost of reneging and the gains from reneging
intersect at most at one single point when d ∈ [0, 1] . Thus, there is a value
of d for which dk = CS (d; δ, k), which determines the maximal promise
believed by voters. Let edS denote this value. As before we have that (see
figure A.6):
edS (δ, k) = 0 if δ = 0
0 < edS (δ, k) < 1 if 0 < δ < 1
1+ 2
k+1−2
(k+1)(k+2)edS (δ, k) = 1 if δ ≥ 1
1+ 2
k+1−2
(k+1)(k+2)
Observe that when candidates’ utility functions are strictly concave,
there are always some promises diﬀerent from the candidates’ ideal points
that are believable by voters, as long as the discount factor is greater than
zero. And as in the linear case, when the discount factor increases, the set
of believable promises also increases, since ∂ eCS (d; δ, k) /∂δ
= eCS (d; δ, k) / (1− δ) ≥ 0. Finally, if the discount factor is suﬃciently
large, all promises are incentive compatible.
We can also show that the maximal promise believed by voters increases
with the degree of concavity of the candidates’ utility function, that is,
∂ edS (δ, k)
∂k
≥ 0
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since the cost of reneging for each value of d increases with the degree of
concavity we have that15
∂ eCS (d; δ, k)
∂k
≥ 0
and, on the other hand, the gain from reneging decreases with the degree
of concavity
∂
¡
dk
¢
∂k
= dk ln d ≤ 0.
Now consider the case in which both candidates have a good reputation.
We first compute the one-election expected payoﬀs for a candidate that has
a good reputation and then a bad reputation, given that the opponent has
a good reputation. We assume that voters believe promises from either
candidate that are at most distance d from the candidate’s ideal point,
and we look for a function edD (δ, k) that characterizes the maximal promise
that candidates will fulfill (and, hence, voters will believe) given that both
candidates have a good reputation. The one-election expected payoﬀ for
a candidate with a good reputation when his opponent has also a good
15This is true since:
1) ∂
eCS(0;δ,k)
∂d increases with k
2) eCS (1; δ, k) increases with k
3) ∂
eCS(d;δ,k)
∂d increases with k
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reputation is:
evGG (d; k) = R 1−d0 R −xR−d−1 − (xR − xL)k dxLdxR
+
R d
0
R 0
−d− (−xL)
k
dxLdxR
+
R 1
d
R −xR+d
−xR − (−xR − xL + d)
k
dxLdxR
+
R −d
−1
R −xL
−xL−d− (−2xL − d)
k
dxRdxL
=
− 1
2 [(2−d)
k+2+dk+2]+1
(k+1)(k+2) +
¡
d
2 − 1
¢
dk+1
k+1 −
d
2
(2−d)k+1
k+1
When computing the expected utility for a candidate with a bad rep-
utation when his opponent has a good reputation, we need to take into
account that the set of promises that voters believe in this case is given by
the function edS (δ, k) found above:
evBG ³edS (δ, k) ; k´ = R 10 R −xR−1 − (xR − xL)k dxLdxR + R 1dS R −xR+edS−xR
− (−2xL)k dxLdxR+
R edS
0
R 0
−xR − (−2xL)
k
dxLdxR =
1
4
2k+2
h
(1−edS)k+2−3i+1
(k+1)(k+2)
As before, given the one-election expected utilities we find the value of
the future expected payoﬀs, and the cost of reneging as
eCD (d; δ, k) = eVGG (d; δ, k)− eVBG (d; δ, k) =
δ
1− δ
hevGG (d; k)− evBG ³edS (δ, k) ; k´i
Using the previous expressions we obtain the cost of reneging as a
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function of the size of the set of credible promises when the two candidates
have a good reputation, for each maximal amount of credible promises
when only one candidate has a good reputation:
eCD ³d; δ, k, edS´ =
δ
1−δ
"
− 1
2 [(2−d)
k+2+dk+2]− 142
k+2
h
(1−edS)k+2−3i
(k+1)(k+2) +
¡
d
2 − 1
¢
dk+1
k+1 −
d
2
(2−d)k+1
k+1
#
First notice that for all edS (δ, k) > 0 if voters believe no promises other
than the candidates’ ideal points (when both candidates have a good rep-
utation), the cost of reneging is still positive (and recall that edS = 0 only
when δ = 0):
eCD ³0; δ, k, edS´ = δ
1− δ


2k
·
1−
³
1− edS´k+2¸
(k + 1) (k + 2)

 > 0
This implies that the cost of losing a good reputation for one of the
candidates, when both have a good reputation might be positive, even
if no promises are being believed by voters. This can happen if some
promises are believed by voters only when a single candidate has a good
reputation. The reason for this anomaly is that if a candidate were to lose
his reputation they would revert to the state in which only one candidate
has a good reputation, that is a state in which the amount of credible
promises is given by edS > 0. In that state the candidate with a bad
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reputation is worse oﬀ than when both have good reputations, even if no
promises are believed in that case.
Furthermore, we have that the cost of reneging in this case is increasing
with the size of the set of believable promises16:
∂ eCD (d; δ, k)
∂d
=
δ
1− δ
·
d
2
(2− d)k − 1
2
(2− d) dk
¸
≥ 0
We can also show that for low values of d, eCD (d; δ, k) is a convex
function of d, and as d increases eCD (d; δ, k) becomes a concave function:
∂2
³ eCD (d; δ, k)´
∂d2
=
δ
1− δ
·
1− d
2
(k + 1)
¸ h
(2− d)k−1 − dk−1
i
And ∂2
³ eCD (d; δ, k)´ /∂d2 ≤ 0 if and only if d ≥ 2/ (k + 1) .
For a given value of k the maximal credible promise, denoted by edD (δ, k)
is given by the largest value of d that satisfies (see figure A.7):
eCD (d; δ, k) ≥ dk.
16Since
∂( eCD(d;δ,1))
∂d = 0 and
∂
Ã
∂( eCD(d;δ,k))
∂d
!
∂k =
δ
1−δ
h
d
2 (2− d)
k ln (2− d)− 12 (2− d) d
k ln d
i
≥ 0
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In this case we also have that the size of the set of credible promises
increases with the value of the discount factor, if edD (δ, k) > 0:
edD (δ, k) = 0 if δ = 0
0 < edD (δ, k) < 1 if 0 < δ < 1
1+
2k[3−(1−dS)k+2]−k−3
(k+1)(k+2)edD (δ, k) = 1 if δ ≥ 1
1+
2k[3−(1−dS)k+2]−k−3
(k+1)(k+2)
Finally, we have that the cost of reneging for all d is an increasing
function of k, that is,17
∂CD (d; δ, k)
∂k
≥ 0.
and
∂
³edD ³δ, k, edS´´
∂k
≥ 0.
Since we have already shown that the gain from reneging for all d
decreases with k, we obtain that the value of the maximal credible promise
17This is true since:
1) eCD (0; δ, k) increases with k
2) eCD (1; δ, k) increases with k
3) ∂
eCD(d;δ,k)
∂d increases strictly with k for all d ∈ (0, 1) .
Then we must have that if k < k0 then for all d < d0eCD (d; δ, k0)− eCD (d; δ, k) < eCD (d0; δ, k0)− eCD (d0; δ, k)
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increases as k gets larger. ¨
Proof of Proposition 3
Consider first the case in which one the candidates has a good reputa-
tion (L) while the other candidate has a bad reputation (R).
In this case, we have that the expected payoﬀ from one election for
candidate L are:
vBB (d) =
1
2
u (0) +
1
2
u (1) = −1
2
vGB (d) =
1
2
u (0) +
Z 1+d
2
1
2
u (2m− 1) dm+ 1− d
2
u (1) = −1
2
+
d
2
µ
1− d
2
¶
Thus the cost of reneging when the opponent has a bad reputation is
CS (d) = VGB (d; δ)− VBB (d; δ) =
δ
1− δ
d
2
µ
1− d
2
¶
Since the maximal gain from reneging is d we have that the maximal
promise that is incentive compatible is (see figure A.8):
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dS (δ) =



0 if δ ≤ 23
23δ−2
δ
if 23 ≤ δ ≤
4
5
1 if 45 ≤ δ
0 δ ≤ 23
23δ−2
δ
2
3 ≤ δ ≤
4
5
1 δ ≥ 45
As before the maximal promise that is credible in equilibrium when
only one candidate has a good reputation is an increasing function of the
discount factor. For small values of the discount factor
¡
δ ≤ 23
¢
no promises
are believed, and for large values all promises are believed
¡
δ ≥ 45
¢
.
Now consider the case in which the two candidates have a good repu-
tation. The expected payoﬀs from one election for candidate L are:
vGG (δ) =
1−d
2 uL (0) +
R 1
2
1−d
2
uL (2m− 1 + d) dm+R 1+d
2
1
2
uL (2m− d) dm+ 1−d2 uL (1) = −
1
2
vBG (δ) = −1− vGB (δ) = −12 −
dS
2
³
1− dS2
´
Thus the cost of reneging in this case is:
CD (d; δ) = VGG (d; δ)− VBG (d; δ) =
δ
1− δ
dS
2
µ
1− d
S
2
¶
= dS (δ)
Therefore, in this case we will also have that dD (δ) = dS (δ) , that is
the maximal credible promise when both candidates have good reputation
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coincides with the maximal credible promise that a candidate can make
when his opponent has a bad reputation. ¨
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Figure 1: Equilibrium with Simultaneous 
Moves in a two dimensional Policy Space. 
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Figure 2: Equilibrium with Sequential Moves in a Two
Dimensional Policy Space
